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In real world, individual rationality varies for the sake of the diversity of people’s individuality.
In order to investigate how diversity of agent’s rationality affects the evolution of cooperation,
we introduce the individual rationality proportional to the βth power of the each agent’s degree.
Simulation results on heterogeneous scale-free network show that the dynamic process is greatly
affected by the diversity of rationality. Both promotion and inhibition of cooperative behavior
can be observed at different region of parameter β. We present explanation to these results by
quantitative and qualitative analysis. The nodes with middle degree value are found to play a
critical role in the evolutionary processes. The inspiration from our work may provide us a deeper
comprehension towards some social phenomenon.
PACS numbers:
I. INTRODUCTION
In evolutionary biology, behavioral sciences, and more
recently in economics, understanding conditions for the
emergence and maintenance of cooperative behavior
among selfish individuals becomes a central issue [1, 2].
Including cooperation and defection as the two compet-
ing strategies, the prisoner’s dilemma game (PDG) is re-
garded as a paradigm for studying this issue [3]-[6].
Based on a structured population [7]-[11], consider-
able efforts have been extended by allowing the players
to voluntary participating [12], or introducing dynamic
network model [13, 14], dynamic payoff matrices [15], dy-
namic preferential selection [16], and difference between
interaction and learning neighborhoods [17]. Santos and
Pacheco [18] have studied the PDG on heterogeneous
scale-free networks, and observed that, when the under-
lying network is scale-free, cooperation can be greatly
enhanced and becomes the dominating trait throughout
the entire range of parameters of the game, due to the
cooperators’ cluster forming nature [19].
In the mentioned works, individual particularity is
not the main topic. However, particularity is ubiqui-
tous among the individuals of social groups and animal
species. Thus, the diversity of individuality inevitably
appears between the players engaging in the evolution-
ary games. Instead of taking individual difference into
account directly, some works concentrate on the individ-
ual similarity [20]-[22]. Recently, it has been directly
proved that diversity of certain individual property can
efficiently promote cooperative behavior in evolutionary
games [23, 24]. The authors introduce social member’s
extrinsically determined properties, like wealth or social
status, to increase or decrease the fitness of a player de-
pending on its location on the spatial grid. Different
scaling factors are provided to different nodes, rescaling
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their payoff matrix in PDG [23].
Different from the diversity of extrinsically determined
properties [23, 24], this paper concentrates on the di-
versity of the intrinsic property, individual rationality.
Szabo´’s stochastic evolutionary rule [25], especially the
Fermi upgrading rule, has taken this vital and intrinsi-
cally determined property into account. In the formula of
Fermi rule, the variable temperature indicates how ratio-
nal the individual is, when making decision in the game.
Just as temperature in statistical physics, this very vari-
able, in former works [26]-[29] was viewed mainly as a
stochastic noise. Phenomena like stochastic resonance
[27] and second-order phase transition [28] are discov-
ered. These works have considered the individual ratio-
nality to be at the same value for every player in the
game. Therefore, this variable actually serves as a re-
flection of collective rationality belonged to the whole
system. However, in real society, individual rationality
depends on its intelligence, disposition, motivation, and
circumstance, which differ from individual to individual.
Serving as an intrinsic factor, different level of rationality
determines different choice and correspondingly fosters
different game result. Within our study, we regard the
degree of a node as a rank of the individual’s certain so-
cial feature, for instance, social status, and directly relate
this feature to the individual rationality. An agent’s ra-
tionality is set to be proportional to the βth power of the
agent’s degree [30]. In this way, the diversity of rational-
ity is associated with the diversity of degree. Networks
with a heterogeneous topological structure are used in
our work. We reported below that cooperation is en-
hanced in a certain region of parameter β, but inhibited
in other region.
The model and simulation result are presented in sec-
tion II. To explore the mechanism for both promotion and
inhibition of cooperation, we present a statistical analy-
sis to the dynamic process in terms of microscopic argu-
ments in section III. Final conclusion is to be drawn in
section IV, as well as some sociological inspirations from
our findings.
2II. THE MODEL AND SIMULATION RESULT
To introduce the diversity of the intrinsic property, ra-
tionality, we consider an evolutionary two-strategy pris-
oner’s dilemma game with players located on vertices of
a heterogeneous network. Each individual is allowed to
interact with its nearest neighbors, and self-interactions
are excluded. Players can adopt one of the two simplest
strategies: “cooperate” (C) and “defect” (D). The strat-
egy adoption mechanism is based on the rescaled version
of the payoff matrix introduced by Nowak [31]:
C D
C
D
(
1 0
b 0
)
(1 < b < 2) (1)
During the evolutionary process, a player located on node
i can follow the strategy of one of its randomly chosen
neighbor at node j, with the probability depending on
the payoff difference (Mi −Mj),
Wij =
1
1 + exp[(Mi −Mj)/Ti]
(2)
This is the Fermi updating rule [25], where Ti charac-
terize the level of rationality pertained to node i. And
Ti = 0 denotes complete rationality, where the individ-
ual always adopts the best strategy determinately; while
Ti > 0, it introduces some irrational factor, that there
is small possibility to select the worse one; Ti → ∞ de-
notes that the individual is completely irrational, and its
decision is random. Within this study we consider the
diversity of rationality defined by the following function
[30]:
Ti = NT0
kβi∑
l k
β
l
(3)
where N is the total number of nodes in the network, and
ki is the degree of node i. Here we adopt the Baraba´si-
Albert scale-free network [32, 33]. T0 denotes the average
value of rationality. We use parameter β to tune the rela-
tionship between node i’s degree ki and its rationality Ti.
While β < 0, nodes with larger degree gain lower value
of rationality. While β = 0, rationality is uniformly dis-
tributed. β > 0 denotes a reversed situation as compared
with the case β < 0: nodes with larger degree gain larger
value of rationality. If β = 1, rationality is distributed by
power-law. It is worth mentioning that significantly high
value of Ti could induce substantially random behavior
of an agent, though payoff difference may be large. On
the contrary, very low Ti would heavily enhance agent’s
sensitivity towards higher payoff.
The case of β = 0 is discussed in [18, 19]. Although the
updating mechanism we adopt is different from [18, 19],
when T is low, at a microscopic scale the following fact
still exist: cooperators tend to occupy the hubs, since
hubs are directly connected, if a defector occasionally
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FIG. 1: The frequencies of cooperators ρc versus the tempta-
tion to defect b at different average value of rationality T0 = 1,
12, and 60, and β = −1, 0, and 1.
takes over one hub, the probability that it gets reoccu-
pied by a cooperator becomes essentially one. However,
while using Fermi updating rule, this fact may be affected
by high rationality value. Fig.1 is plotted to explore the
influence of rationality in both cases, β = 0 and β 6= 0.
The BA network is built with the initial number of nodes:
m0 = 2, the number of edges linked to the exiting nodes
from the newly added node in each time step: m = 2,
and the average degree k¯ = 4. The total number of nodes
is N = 4225. Before the start of each game simulation,
both strategies populate the spatial grid uniformly. We
adopted a synchronous updating scheme. All the simu-
lation results were obtained by averaging over 1000 gen-
erations after a transient time of 5000 generations. Each
data is obtained by averaging over ten different network
realizations with ten runs for each realization.
In Fig.1, in the case of β = 0, when T0 = 1, cooper-
ation is dominating over the entire range of the temp-
tation to defect b, but sharp decrease of the frequencies
of cooperators ρC can be measured when T0 becomes
large. This indicates that the cooperation promoted by
hubs is indeed sensitive to the value of rationality. At
the same time, in the case of β = −1, the value of ρC
is not evidently affected by intense variation of T0, and
there always exists a broad range in the parameter space
within which cooperation rule completely. Thus, there
must be other factors contributing to the facilitation of
cooperation.
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FIG. 2: The frequencies of cooperators C versus β. Left:
The temptation to defect b = 1.04, 1.08, 1.6, and 1.75. The
average value of rationality T0 = 1. Middle: The temptation
to defect b = 1.4. The average value of rationality T0 = 0.1,
0.2, 0.3, 0.4, and 0.5. Right: The temptation to defect b = 1.8.
The average value of rationality T0 = 0.1, 0.2, 0.3, and 0.4.
To further investigate how cooperation is influenced by
the parameter β, the variation of ρC versus β is demon-
strated in Fig.2. It is observed that ρc and β have appar-
ently non-monotonous relationship. The shapes of the
curves are similar to a gorge located in a plateau. This
shape indicates that diversity of rationality can either
promote or inhibit cooperation, depending on the value of
β. To highlight the sharp contrast between the effective
promotion and serious inhibition, in this paper the gorge
is called cooperation crisis. The two downside graphes of
Fig.2 show the cases of relatively small values of average
rationality, where the similar phenomenon is observed.
Higher value of T0 or b only results in larger width of
the gorge, leaving the shape of the curves unchanged.
These results reveal that the evolutionary dynamics is
particularly sensitive to rationality distribution. In or-
der to explain the main features of the reported results,
especially the cooperation crisis, we hereafter scrutinize
in depth the microscopic evolution of cooperation.
III. ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION
When β = 0, in [18, 19], the prevalence of cooperation
is because that on the heterogeneous network topology,
hubs can stick together the cooperator cycles that would
otherwise be disconnected, and form stable cooperative
clusters (C cluster) [19]. In [19], a cooperative cluster,
namely a cooperator core, is a connected component fully
and permanently occupied by pure cooperators. While
invaded by defectors, the local structure of a C cluster can
be viewed as a C strategy hub surrounded by a number
of periphery neighbors, most of which are cooperators.
Then whether C clusters are stable or not when β 6= 0
is to be analyzed. Two opposite effects generated by
four crucial dynamic processes determine the fluctuation
number of cooperators and defectors in a C cluster in
every next time step, and thus determine the stability of
the C cluster:
Effect1: Corruption of C cluster
Process (A): the hub node of a C cluster adopts
the strategy of a periphery defector, and then
transits to D strategy;
Process (D): a periphery cooperator adopts the
strategy of the hub defector, and then transits
to D strategy.
Effect2: Consolidation of C cluster
Process (B): a hub defector adopts the strategy
of a periphery cooperator, and then transits
to C strategy;
Process (C): a periphery defector adopts the
strategy of the hub node of a C cluster, and
then transits to C strategy.
The four processes are corresponding to four kinds of
strategy transition probability according to the Fermi up-
dating rule. Based on mean-field approximation, imaging
a localized block in the network, a node is surrounded by
k neighbors among which the cooperators have a propor-
tion of µ while the defectors have the rest fraction (1−µ).
The payoff difference between a cooperator and a defec-
tor can be denoted by µ(ki−kjb) or µ(kib−kj). Because
the mean-field hypothesis is not always fit for the evo-
lutionary games on networks, the following analysis can
only be qualitative. From equation (2) and (3), we gain
the four kinds of transition probability:
Effect1


Process(A): WH→PC→D =
1
1+exp[
µ(kH−kP b)
T0
(k¯β/kβH )]
Process(D): WP→HC→D =
1
1+exp[
µ(kP−kHb)
T0
(k¯β/kβ
P
)]
(4)
Effect2


Process(B): WH→PD→C =
1
1+exp[
µ(kHb−kP )
T0
(k¯β/kβ
H
)]
Process(C): WP→HD→C =
1
1+exp[
µ(kP b−kH )
T0
(k¯β/kβ
P
)]
(5)
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FIG. 3: The probability of high degree nodes’ strategies tran-
siting to the strategies of middle (left) and small (right) de-
gree nodes. kL = 172, kM = 30, and kS = 2. The black lines
denote the probability of process (A), and the red lines de-
note the probability of process (B). The temptation to defect
b = 1.4, and the average value of rationality T0 = 1.
The upper scripts H and P denote hub and periph-
ery respectively. Through these two formulas, the term
(k¯β/kβ) remodifies and extends the Fermi rule.
The strategy transition of a hub or periphery node is
determined by the four processes. For a hub node, both
process (A) and (B) could happen; for a periphery node,
both process (C) and (D) could happen. If occurrence
rates of process (A) are higher than of (B), and of (D)
are higher than of (C), separately, then C clusters are
unstable, and the whole system will asymptotically be
meshed in a absorbing state of D. We can regard the
strategy transition probability in a certain process as the
occurrence rate of this process.
To calculate the four kinds of transition probability
of nodes with different degree value, we approximately
classify the nodes in the following way: (1)Nodes with
small value of degree: m ≤ kS ≤ k¯; (2)Nodes with mid-
dle value of degree: k¯ < kM < k
′; (3)Nodes with large
value of degree: k′ ≤ kL ≤ kmax. Fig.3 shows the strat-
egy transition probability of the high degree nodes(the
upper scripts L, M , and S respectively denote nodes
with large, middle, and small value of degree). Sharp
increase can be observed from the region of cooperation
crisis (see Fig.2), and the probability of process (A) is
slightly higher than process (B), but they both become
equivalent to 0.5 when β gets larger. However, in Fig.4,
curves concerning the strategy transition probability of
the middle degree nodes present a symmetrical fashion.
More importantly, large variation ofW only exists in the
region of crisis, where process (A) always obtains larger
occurrence rate than process (B), and process (D) always
obtains larger occurrence rate than process (C). These re-
sults indicate the advantage of defectors, especially while
middle degree nodes participating in the game. In our
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FIG. 4: The probability of middle degree nodes’ strategies
transiting to the strategies of high (a), small (b), and middle
(c and d) degree nodes. In graph (a) and (c), black lines
denote the probability of process (A), and red lines denote the
probability of process (B); in graph (b) and (d), black lines
denote the probability of process (D), and red lines denote the
probability of process (C). kL = 172, kM1 = 12, kM2 = 30,
and kS = 2. The temptation to defect b = 1.4, and the
average value of rationality T0 = 1.
calculation, we build a BA network with the largest de-
gree kmax = 172 and the smallest degree kS = m = 2.
For simplicity, degrees for the three classes of nodes are
confined to isolated values. For example, here we set
k′ = 50; high degree value: kL1 = 172 and kL2 = 100;
middle degree value: kM1 = 12 and kM2 = 30; low degree
value: kS = 2; and µ = 0.75. Small value change brings
no impact on the qualitative results.
To explore the roots of the agents’ diverse behavior,
Fig.5 is plotted to examine the rationality variation ver-
sus β for the three classes of nodes. The rationality
of the nodes with smallest and largest degree displays
a monotonous decrease and increase respectively, while
that of nodes with other degree value varies in a non-
monotonous fashion. Mathematical explanation to the
numerical results is not complicated. It is crucial to note
that the peak values of TM are all around the region
where the cooperation crisis takes place. These peaks
nicely explain the large variation in Fig.4. Furthermore,
the monotonous increase of rationality of the nodes with
the the largest degree results in the asymmetrical fash-
ion in Fig.3, as well as in Fig.2. Indeed, rationality value
change contributes to agents’ behavior change.
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FIG. 5: The rationality of different degree nodes TS , TM , and
TL versus β. kS = 2, 3, and 4. kM = 8, 20, and 30. kS = 100,
126, and 172. The average value of rationality T0 = 1.0.
In the region where the rationality of middle degree
nodes reach their peak, a node with relatively larger de-
gree becomes rather irrational, and thus gains a much
higher probability to adopt the strategy of a node with
relatively lower payoff and lower degree. Simultaneously,
nodes with relatively lower degree, for their irrationality,
are not inclined to imitate their larger degree and higher
payoff neighbors. Consequently, this mechanism deteri-
orates the validity of the cooperation-facilitating mech-
anism reported in [18, 19]. As a result of the predom-
inance of process (A) and (D) against (B) and (C), as
demonstrated in Fig.4, defectors, though initially may
be the minority in a C cluster, do not only obtain a great
chance to survive, but also propagate fast and asymp-
totically dominate the whole network. This is why the
C clusters fail to maintain their stability and why co-
operation crisis occurs. The peak rationality values of
middle degree nodes play a key role. Outside this region,
cooperative behavior is promoted.
On the left side of crisis, especially when β < 0,
large and middle degree nodes are very rational. For
high and middle-ranking defectors, when severely weak-
ened by the low-ranking neighbors who follow their defec-
tive strategies, low rationality value will result in much
greater sensitivity towards payoff, then a little higher
payoff of a neighbor is enough attractive for them to im-
itate this neighbor, even if the degree of which is much
lower. Thereby, they gain much greater chance to tran-
sit to C strategy than in the case of β = 0, in which
low-ranking players could hardly influence the high and
middle-ranking ones. Clearly, when β < 0, the effi-
ciency of cooperation promotion is largely enhanced, even
though T0 is significantly large.
On the right side of crisis, the decision of a node with
high degree becomes random, and its strategy transition
probability only depends on the proportion between its
neighboring cooperators and defectors. This irrational
hub is surrounded by large number of rational nodes with
middle and small degree, and these nodes can quickly
form a obedient domain around it and leave it with few
defective neighbors. On the other hand, highly rational
neighbors of a hub defector would first adopt the hub’s
strategy, simultaneously resulting in a sudden drop of the
hub’s payoff, then abandon this strategy, for the sake that
the low payoff hub hardly affects them and their cooper-
ator neighbors with a little higher payoff could overturn
their D strategies. After that, the hub defectors will gain
much more cooperative neighbors, and thus much greater
probability to transit into a cooperator. These facts ex-
ist at high T0, too. Notably, middle degree nodes are
rational outside crisis, but irrational in crisis.
Based on the above discussion, as parameter β varies
from negative value to a large positive value, the system
experiences successive sorts of dynamic processes, corre-
sponding to the different parts and different shapes of
the curves (ρc versus β, show as Fig.2). When β is small
or negative, ρC is on the plateau. For nodes with large
and middle degree, process (A), (B), (C), and (D) have
approximately the same occurrence rate, and the whole
system is globally dominated by cooperation. When β
gets larger, process (A) and (D) begin to show consider-
able predominance over process (C) and (B), and thus,
the stability of C clusters is severely disturbed. When β
is further increased, process (A) and (D) becomes over-
whelming, and C clusters are totally destroyed. ρC de-
cays abruptly into the valley, and the crisis comes. When
β continues to increase, the predominance of process (A)
and (D) starts to decline, and C clusters begin to res-
urrect. Finally, cooperative behavior holds global preva-
lence, and the probability of the four process return to a
similar value. ρC arrives at another plateau.
IV. CONCLUSION
To sum up, in this paper, we introduce a set of ratio-
nality distributions to investigate the effect of rationality
diversity on evolutionary prisoner’s dilemma game on BA
Scale-Free network. Our model remodifies the Fermi up-
dating rule, and our results largely extend the results in
[18, 19]. Our work reveals that diversity of individual
rationality heavily influences the evolutionary process.
Two routes, produced through two sorts of rationality
distributions (on the two sides of crisis), promote co-
operation, even while the average value of rationality is
high. On the contrary, severe deterioration of coopera-
tion, namely the cooperation crisis, also appears in an-
other sort of rationality distribution. By analyzing the
6stability of C clusters, causation of the routes of cooper-
ation promotion and deterioration is interpreted.
The crucial contribution made by nodes with middle
degree value may provide some sociological inspiration.
Degree is often viewed as a certain rank of game players.
Perhaps we could analogize it to some social rank of in-
dividuals, then middle degree nodes might be related to
the middle class, which is neither the most powerful class
nor the most populous class. Middle class could serve as
social stabilizer, pointed out by Samuel P. Huntington
[34]. However, middle class could also display subversive
function, argued by Huntington’s opponents. Individ-
ual rationality could be affected by political or econom-
ical factors, and are not unchangeable. Probably, since
the organization of society largely depends on the emer-
gence of cooperation [35]-[37], such two contrary func-
tions could be relevant to two rationality level of middle
class in two sorts of rationality distribution. Further in-
vestigation on the diversity of rationality might yield new
insights towards complex social phenomenon.
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